







Poincaré’s conventionalism has thoroughly transformed both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. Not only proponents of conventionalism, such as the logical positivists, were influenced by Poincaré, but also outspoken critics of conventionalism, such as Quine and Putnam, were inspired by his daring position. Indeed, during the twentieth century, most philosophers of mathematics and of science engaged in dialogue with conventionalism. As is often the case with such complex clusters of ideas, there is no consensus about the meaning of conventionalism in general, and Poincaré’s original version of it, in particular. Nonetheless, notions such as the under-determination (of theory), empirical equivalence (of incompatible theories), implicit definition, holism and conceptual relativity, all of which can be linked to Poincare's writings (even if not under those very names) have become central to philosophy. This essay explores the impact of some of these notions on twentieth century philosophy of science. In addition to inspiration based on Poincare's actual views, it emphasizes directions based on misreading and unjustified appropriations of Poincaré. 

The impact of an individual or an idea is an elusive notion, extremely difficult to measure. On the face of it, explicit references (to the individual or the idea) are the best indication of influence, but they too are obscured by conscious and unconscious reasons and motives. One can cite an individual or an idea for any number of reasons other than the obvious one of being the source and origin of the speaker or writer's own ideas. All the more so, the absence of direct reference cannot be taken at face value as an indication of the lack of influence. Furthermore, impact is a social process which depends on interpretation, accessibility, chains of transmission and even sheer luck. One often ascribes an idea to x which x has never expressed or which had in fact been expressed earlier by y and so on. And for sure, impact is not always a reliable measure of the merit of a work. Take Peirce: there is hardly an idea in twentieth century philosophy of science which has not been anticipated by Peirce, but Peirce was neither accessible nor lucky and thus, the impact of his work was far less dramatic than it deserves. On the other hand, someone like Einstein is often credited with philosophical ideas only vaguely reminiscent of his own. Bearing these caveats in mind, I will try,nonetheless, to say something about the impact of Poincare's ideas on the philosophy of science and mathematics. 

Unsurprisingly, I take conventionalism to be the concept most worthy of our attention when assessing Poincare's impact. This predictable choice may seem disappointing to some contemporary writers and interpreters. For example, as structural realism has becomes fashionable, and as this position has been ascribed to Poincare, should we not give it a place, on a par with conventionalism, in Poincare's legacy?  I think we should not. It was evidently conventionalism that inspired the logical positivists, that Wittgenstein struggled with and that Russell, Einstein Quine and Putnam tried to refute. The question of whether all of these thinkers had the same understanding of conventionalism is quite beside the point. Obviously they differ. Obviously Poincaré, like any other great thinker can be variously interpreted and has occasionally been misread and misunderstood. But it was conventionalism, nonetheless (and not structural realism or any other 'ism') that these philosophers thought they could not afford to ignore. 






In the context of scientific method, conventionalism is associated with the notions of 
equivalent descriptions and underdetermination, and consequently also with the idea that with regard to some crucial theoretical questions there may be no fact of the matter. These ideas are connected via the concept of discretion. When theories are underdetermined by fact, we can have alternative theories that differ in their content, or are even inconsistent with one another, but are, nevertheless, equally satisfactory in terms of the predictions they yield. Such theories are logically distinct but empirically equivalent. In this situation, scientists have discretion as to which theory to employ. Their choice in such cases, even though not arbitrary, can be said to be guided by convention, that is, by considerations such as simplicity and elegance.  

The concept of underdetermination is based on an analogy with mathematics: When we have fewer equations than needed to yield the solution, we can fix some of the variables by fiat and solve the equations for the rest. Poincaré used the analogy to argue for underdetermination in a number of cases, the most famous of which is his argument for the underdetermination of geometry by experience. (Although it is Pierre Duhem rather than Poincaré who is usually credited with the idea of underdetermination in science, it can be shown that the first appearance of this idea in Duhem's writings follows Poincarés critique of some optical experiments)  The notion of underdetermination turned out to be extremely popular and yet, we should be aware of the fact that it had different meanings for different philosophers. Underdetermination of theory by fact became a center piece in Quine's philosophy of science and in his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. Kuhn  acknowledged the influence of this idea on his own conception of science. There is a big difference, however, between underdetermination as originating in Poincaré's philosophy and extrapolations of this idea in Kuhnian and post Kuhnian philosophy of science.

To begin with, there is a question about facts (or experiences), where facts are the real, non-conventional basis of science. For Poincaré, geometry was underdetermined by experience. In this picture there are events that happen (or fail to happen) objectively in the world,  but the ways in which these events are ordered in space and time, that is, the specific geometry we take them to instantiate, is, for Poincaré, a matter of convention. In other words, if the event in question is a train crash it will be part of any adequate theory and any adequate geometry. In this respect, there are facts of the matter in Poincaré's picture of science. He used the analogy of a library: Whether the library has a certain book is a matter of objective fact, but the catalogue can still be variously organized. As long as a catalogue has the correct information about the books, there is no right and wrong here. The logical positivists were likewise committed to the distinction between matter of experience or observation, which are objective, and matter of language and description, which are conventional. Thus, they too retain a factual basis of science. For Kuhn, on the other hand, observations are "theory laden" which means that there are no objective facts independent of theory. I am not claiming Kuhn would actually say that the occurrence of an event such as a train crash is a matter of perspective, but his view invites much more skepticism about the very notion of fact than we can find in Poincaré .  

Second, and no less important is the issue of incommensurability which appeared in both Kuhn and Feyerabend, and has captured the imagination of scholars ever since. Incommensurability, as you recall, is the most radical of Kuhn's epistemological thesis, the basis of the allegation that paradigms cannot be compared either with one another or with reality. It is thus a devastating blow to belief in the progress of science and its very rationality. Now, Paradigms are incommensurable, Kuhn argued, because there is no translation between them. By contrast, for Poincaré it is the existence of a translation between theories that makes them empirically equivalent and renders the choice between them conventional. Thus while empirical equivalence makes room for convention, it does not undermine the rationality of science. Unfortunately this huge difference is not always sufficiently recognized.

To illustrate: Length and weight are incommensurable, which means that you cannot measure weight in meters or length in kilograms. It also means that questions such as "what is more, 3 meters or 2 kilograms" make no sense. But it does not mean that there is no fact of the matter regarding the question "how long is this suitcase?" And it is compatible with the view that the answer "5 kilograms" is simply wrong. By contrast, meters and centimeters are not incommensurable and thus it makes perfect sense to ask what is more 1 meter or 101 centimeters. At the same time, there is no fact of the matter as to whether the length of the suitcase is 1 meter or 100 centimeter. One unit may at most be more practical. 

We can now appreciate the difference between Poincaré's no-fact-of-the-matter argument and its Kuhnian offspring. For Poincaré, no-fact-of-the-matter cases are linked to equivalence and underdetermination—it does not matter which geometry we choose because each one of the geometries he considered could account for the same facts.
For Kuhn, on the other hand, there is no fact of the matter (about the truth of paradigms, say) because there are no objective facts, no unbiased arbitrators we can refer to. It follows that indeterminacy and incommensurability are not as closely connected as one often tends to assume.  Kuhn is partly responsible for the confusion: He argued that paradigms are incommensurable (by which he means not inter-translatable) and therefore there could be no fact of the matter as to which is right. But I am claiming that the best cases of indeterminacy –cases where there is no fact of the matter-- are cases of empirical equivalence. Theories that are empirically equivalent can (some would say, must) be inter-translatable and need not at all be incommensurable. Both Quine and Poincare cite such cases Clearly, for them indeterminacy is not linked with incommensurability. 






II.	The Nature of Necessary Truth.

For Poincaré, the two problems – the problem of underdetermination of theory reviewed in the previous section, and the problem of necessary truth are interconnected. Their common origin is the development of non-Euclidean geometries. Since there are different geometries, Poincare argued, the axioms of each of them can no longer be seen as necessary truths. Instead, they should be construed as definitions—implicit definitions. On this point –the nature of axioms-- Poincare and Hilbert were in agreement. Moreover, as definitions, the axioms are denied not only the status of necessity, but also the status of truth.  According to Poincaré, therefore, the axioms of geometry are neither true nor false; they are conventions. The different geometries (he considered here only geometries of constant curvature), although seemingly incompatible with one another, are in fact equivalent – all of them can account for the same mathematical facts. They differ only in the way they describe the facts. The choice between them does not pertain to truth but to the best way of describing it. Clearly a choice of a mode of description is conventional. At the same time, such conventionality need not offend our concept of truth. 

This conception of geometry and its axioms was first developed by Poincaré in the mathematical context. But he then addressed the question of whether any one of the alternative geometries can be said to be true of the actual world, true as a matter of empirical, that is contingent, fact. He answered in the negative. Here he employed the concept of underdetermination: Geometry, he claimed, is underdetermined by experience. His argument was that if the laws of nature are properly adjusted, the different geometries would maintain their equivalence not only in the abstract mathematical realm but also vis a vis observation. This was Poincaré's major innovation: Whereas Helmholtz, for instance, thought that the laws of nature could tell us which geometry is true in the actual world, Poincare maintained that any observation is compatible with different geometries and cannot serve to distinguish between them.   

The importance of the notion of implicit definition can hardly be overstated. Despite the fierce objections of two of the great philosophers of the period—Frege and Russell—the Poincare-Hilbert conception has certainly become dominant at least as far as the practice of mathematics goes. Most mathematicians no longer been viewed the axioms of geometry as necessary, neither in the modal sense of being true in all possible worlds nor in the epistemic sense of being so deeply grounded in intuition that their denial is inconceivable.The replacement of the obscure notion of necessary truth with that of convention had a tremendous liberating effect. Unlike the traditional concept of necessary truth, the new concept is friendly and mundane. In addition, the notion of implicit definition solved the formidable epistemic problem of how necessary truths could ever 
come to be known. For while it is hard to see how we can grasp what is true in all possible worlds, it seems quite obvious that we can master definitions and rules of our own making. These advantages of the conventionalist position over earlier accounts of necessity made it highly attractive. With a little bit of wishful thinking it could be easily believed that the problem of necessity or the a priori – "the largest sleeping giant of modern philosophy" -- as Alberto Coffa has termed it has indeed been solved. 

Of course, not everyone succumbed to conventionalism. Quine and Wittgenstein provide particularly interesting examples, for both of them were first strongly attracted to conventionalism but soon turned against it. Thanks to Richard Creath, the Quinean story is fairly well known. In 1934 Quine gave at Harvard three talks on Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language which were quite favorable to conventionalism. But within two years, he wrote "Truth by Convention", which is highly critical of conventionalism.to The case of Wittgenstein is more complex and less familiar. On my reading, Wittgenstein was also attracted to conventionalism for a number of years after the Tractatus, but around 1936 he discovered the rule following paradox, which undermines conventionalism at least as it is commonly understood. This was a turning point not only in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, but in his conception of language in general. I cannot here go into details, but only state my conclusion. Wittgenstein's later philosophy is an outcome of his intricate dialogue with conventionalism. 


But even if we set the critique of these philosophers aside and focus solely on the practice of mathematics, conventionalism cannot ultimately be accepted. The reason is simple: The choice of definitions may indeed be free, but there is a big caveat here-- free as long as they are consistent. Consistency, however, can hardly be said to be a matter of convention. So Coffa's giant is not really sleeping; it is very alive and powerful.

To sum up: Poincaré's philosophy, his concept of convention in particular, gave rise to our sensitivity to cases of equivalence, underdetermination, freedom and discretion. These sensitivities are important and belong in the conceptual tool kit of every scientist and philosopher of science. At the same time, conventionalism also enhanced a permissive attitude towards facts and promoted the big illusion that the problem of the a priori has been solved. On both of these accounts it is worthwhile to revisit the problems and reconsider these anti-realist trends. 


 








